# Ukraine- Sustaining its Economic Recovery

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
## **Political Situation**

- Following the February Presidential elections, a new Parliamentary coalition formed a government loyal to the elected President.
- The new political stability is a welcome change from the political chaos of the past.
- Sergiy Tigipko, a competent manager who received 13% of the vote in the elections, was appointed as Vice Prime Minister for Economic Reforms.
- The authorities are currently developing a reform agenda of structural reforms in key areas such as macroeconomic stability, pension reform, utility pricing, anti-corruption, privatization, deregulation, judiciary reform, and trade liberalization.
- The government has the competence and expertise to implement necessary reforms; still many uncertainties remain on the speed and depth of these transformations.
- The local elections, which are scheduled for the end of 2010, may weaken political will to take some unpopular reforms (i.e., increase in gas tariff and pension reform).
- The new administration has announced a balanced foreign policy between the West and CIS. However initial measures show a predisposition towards Russia (prolongation of lease agreement for Russian fleet and new gas agreement).





## **Ukraine's Real Sector Performance**



Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, National Bank of Ukraine, The Bleyzer Foundation

- The international crisis led to a retrenchment of foreign demand and capital inflows, which caused a sharp fall of Ukrainian exports and a 15% decline of real GDP in 2009.
- The main contraction took place during 4Q of 2008 and the first two months of 2009.
- It bottomed out in March 2009 and has been steadily growing since then.
- A strong recovery of exports supported a 5% GDP rebound in Q1 2010.

WHERE OPPORTUNITIES EMERGE




## What Will Sustain Economic Recovery in Ukraine?

#### **Upside Factors:**

- 1. A swift recovery of world trade, based mainly on an accelerating growth momentum in emerging countries
- 2. Improving global demand for steel products the key export commodities of Ukraine
- **3**. Better international competitiveness thanks to the recent currency depreciation and more favorable terms of trade (higher steel prices and a recent gas price discount).
- 4. Easier access to foreign funds by Ukrainian banks and companies **Downside Risks:**
- 1. Inability to reduce high budget deficits
- 2. Inability to roll-over the current large foreign debt
- 3. Weak banks and a lack of funds to credit the private sector



### **Upside Factor 1: Global Economic Conditions are Improving**



Source: Cbonds.net, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Bleyzer Foundation


- A turnaround in global manufacturing and trade is already supporting recovery.
- Growth prospects in Ukraine's major trading partners are getting better.
- Investors' appetite for emerging market assets is gradually returning as indicated by narrowing spreads on their corporate and sovereign debts and falling CDS rates.
- This helps reduce foreign borrowing costs for governments and businesses.


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


#### **Upside Factor 2: Better Prospects for Steel Industry**

- Metallurgy is the most important sector for the Ukrainian economy.
- Many industries and sectors are tied to metallurgy.
- Exports and industry performance closely follow world steel price trends.








- A new iron ore price setting system was established in March 2010, which boosted ore and steel prices.
- Steel price growth in 2010 will support stronger recovery of Ukraine's economy.



#### **Upside Factor 3: Improved Export Competitiveness**

- In 2008, the Hryvnia lost more than 50% against the U.S. Dollar.
- But the depreciation helped to:
  - restore the loss of international competitiveness, and
  - reduce external imbalances.
- On the import side, a 30% discount on natural gas imports, negotiated with Russia in April will reduce the costs of production and further improve trade balance.
- This favors export-oriented industries chemicals, metallurgy.




\* The effective exchange rate was calculated based on Ukraine's purchasing power parity with respect to Ukraine's main trading partners (2002 as a base year)



### **Upside Factor 4: Better Access to Foreign Capital**


- Foreign debt and capital inflows in Ukraine soared in 2005-2008.
- During the crisis, foreign capital markets were virtually closed.
- High Ukraine's foreign financing needs in 2010 were partially covered by the IMF program.
- Since mid-2009, foreign investors sentiments have been improving.
- In April 2010, there were several successful Eurobond placements by the Ukrainian private businesses.
- The government plans to borrow \$1.3 billion on foreign markets in 2010 & resume IMF cooperation.







#### **Upside Factors: Impact on Domestic Demand**



Source: State Statistics Committee, NBU, GFK-Ukraine, TBF

- Due to the 4 previous upside factors, Consumer Purchasing Power has been gradually increasing.
- Real monthly wage grew by 7% yoy in Mar 2010, compared to a 11% yoy decline in Oct 2009.
- Private consumption will be further supported by continued increases in government social expenditures.



#### **Downside Risks: Public Finances, Debt and Weak Banks**

- •**The major economic risk** for Ukraine would be its inability to reduce the current fiscal deficit.
- •The fiscal deficit was 8.5% GDP in 2009, as fiscal revenues declined, and social, Naftogaz and Pension Fund expenditures increased.
- The deficit was financed by IMF loans and domestic borrowings.
- In 2010, the new government is committed to reduce the budget deficit to 6% of GDP as required by the IMF to resume co-operation.
- On April 27<sup>th</sup>, the 2010 budget law was approved with a state deficit target of about 5% of GDP (including the Pension Fund deficit).
- Agreement with the IMF is critical to overcome this risk.
- •A second economic risk would be the inability of Ukraine to maintain foreign confidence needed to roll-over its large foreign debt.
- •**The third risk** would be a further deterioration of local banks and lack of credit which may restrain the growth of domestic demand.



## **Economic Prospects over Medium-Term**

- In 2010, overall prospects for the Ukrainian economy has notably improved:
  - Real GDP is forecast to grow by 4.5%
  - Current account is expected to turn into surplus
  - Foreign capital inflows are forecast to increase
  - Exchange rate is likely to remain stable and even slightly appreciate
  - Fiscal deficit will be reduced in compliance with the IMF requirements
  - Inflationary pressures will be moderate.
- The new government has the capacity and willingness to restore macroeconomic stability.
- The political situation is now much more stable than in the previous few years.
- Given macroeconomic and political stability, the government may be more prepared to implement broader economic reforms.
- Ukraine has a number of competitive advantages to support economic growth in the medium-term (large population, educated and cheap labor, agricultural potential, reasonable infrastructure, border with the EU).
- Ukraine should be able to grow by 4-5% per year over the next few years.




## **Main Macroeconomic Indicators**


|                             | 2000-07<br>average  | 2008          | 2009   | <b>2010</b> (f)          |
|-----------------------------|---|---------------|--------|--------------------------|
| Real GDP Growth, % yoy      | 7.5   | 2.3           | -15.1  | 4.5                      |
| Fiscal Balance, % GDP       | -0.8  | <b>-2.1</b> * | -8.5** | <b>-6.0</b> <sup>#</sup> |
| Consumer Inflation, %, eop  | 11.3  | 22.3          | 12.3   | 13.0                     |
| UAH/\$ Exchange Rate, eop   | 5.2   | 7.7           | 8.0    | 7.8 – 8.0                |
| Current Account, % GDP      | <u>2000-05</u> <u>2006-07</u><br><b>5.7 -2.6</b>  | -7.0          | -1.5   | 2.0                      |
| Gross Int. Reserves, \$ bn  | $\begin{array}{c c} \underline{2000} & \underline{2007} \\ \hline 1.5 & 32.5 \end{array}$ | 31.5          | 26.5   | 28                       |
| Foreign Gov't Debt, % GDP   | <u>2003</u> <u>2007</u><br><b>21.3 8.7</b>  | 9.2           | 20.5   | 20                       |
| Foreign Private Debt, % GDP | 26.2 47.4   | <b>47.</b> 1  | 68.1   | 55                       |

\* Includes implicit pension fund deficit (credits from unified Treasury account (state budget) to cover pension fund expenditures) \*\* Includes capital injections to Naftogaz (2.7% GDP), implicit Pension Fund deficit (1.7% of GDP) and expenditures covered by IMF's special SDR allocation to Ukraine (1.7% GDP). # Includes Naftogaz imbalances.

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## **Pay-TV and Broadband Access**





Newspapers are dying; the music industry is still yelping about iTunes; book publishers think they are next... But cable and satellite TV breezed through. The Economist, A special report on television, May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010

- Television continues to outperform other media.
- Emerging markets have a great upside potential
  users opt for premium service and more variety as wealth increases.
- Consumers' demand for high-quality pay-TV and broadband access is likely to strengthen on expectations of better economic conditions.
- Low penetration rates and high population density should sustain above average revenue growth in Ukraine.

Source: OECD, International Telecommunications Union, IKS-Consulting, The Economist

