# The Impact of the Global Liquidity Crisis on Ukraine and the Road to Recovery

Dr. Edilberto Segura
Partner & Chief Economist, SigmaBleyzer
Chair of the Advisory Board, The Bleyzer Foundation
October 2009

Ciama Playman

v6

## **Macroeconomic Performance**

From 2000 to Sept. 2008, Ukraine enjoyed overall excellent economic results.

1 /					
	2000-07 average	2008	2009 (f)	2010 (f)	
Real GDP Growth, % yoy	7.5	2.1	-14	3	
Fiscal Balance, % GDP	-0.8	-1.5	-6	-4	
Consumer Inflation, %, eop	11.3	22.3	15	10-13	
UAH/\$ Exchange Rate, eop	5.2	7.7	8-9	8 - 10	
Current Account, % GDP	2000-05 2006-07 <b>5.7</b> -2.6	-7.1	-1	0.5	
Gross Int. Reserves, \$ bn	2000 1.5 2007 32.5	31.5	29	28	
Foreign Gov't Debt, % GDP	2003 21.3 2007 8.7	9.2	24	24	

# The International Liquidity Crisis Hit Ukraine Hard

- PFTS stock index: -74% (2008)
- UAH/\$ Exchange Rate: Depreciated by 58% (4Q 2008)
- Drop in GDP: -19% yoy (1H 2009)
- Export of goods: 49% yoy (Jan-Jul 2009)
- Industrial production: -30% yoy (Jan-Jul 2009)
- Unemployment: 9% (1H 2009; 6% in 2008)
- Real households' income:-10% yoy (1H 2009)

### The Crisis Affected Ukraine Harder

Country	Gross Domestic Product, % yoy, 1Q 2009	Local Currency Depreciation versus the US Dollar				
Ukraine	-20.3	58 %	(4Q 2008)			
Latvia	-18.0	7 %	(1Q 2009)			
Estonia	-15.1	3 %	(1Q 2009)			
Lithuania	-13.6	7 %	(1Q 2009)			
Taiwan	-10.2	3 %	(1Q 2009)			
Singapore	-10.1	6 %	(1Q 2009)			
Russia	-9.5	35 %	(Oct.08-Mar.09)			
Mexico	-8.2	26 %	(4Q 2008)			
Hungary	-6.7	23 %	(Oct.08-Mar.09)			
Romania	-6.2	38 %	(Oct.08-Mar.09)			


Source: The Economist, Central banks of the respective countries, The Bleyzer Foundation

#### **Real Sector Performance in 2009**

GDP Growth, % yoy, and Main Sources of Growth




Sectors' Performance, cumulative growth, % yoy



Source: State Statistics Committee, The Bleyzer Foundation

- Real GDP fell by 19% yoy in 1H 2009.
- Major declines in export-oriented industries and creditdependent sectors (construction, machine-building).


# **Exports and Industry Performance**



- Source: State Statistics Committee, NBU, MEPS, The Bleyzer Foundation
- World commodity prices fell sharply since Aug-Sept. 2008.
- Ukraine's exports of goods dropped by 49% yoy (Jan-Jul 2009).
- Industrial production declined by 30% yoy (Jan-Jul 2009).


# Why Ukraine Was Affected More Severely


Ukraine's Exports by Commodities, % of Total, and Key Trading Partners, % of Commodity Exports, 2008



- 1. Open but undiversified economy:
  - Share of exports in GDP is ~ 50%;
  - Metals, Minerals and Chemicals account for ~60% of exports;
  - Narrow geographic diversification of exports.
- 2. Excessive reliance on foreign capital.
- 3. A combination of three vulnerabilities, as explained below...

# **Vulnerability #1 – Large Current Account Deficits**






Source: NBU, SSC, The Bleyzer Foundation

- Over 2003-2008,
  - Exports grew by 25% pa;
  - But imports by 30% pa;
  - CA deficits emerged in 2006 and
  - Widened to 7% of GDP in 2008.
- 2009 forecast before the crisis: CA deficit - \$ 24 billion, or 13% GDP.

• Uncertain foreign financing put pressures on the Hryvnia.

# **Vulnerability #2 – Large External Debt Repayments**



- External private debt tripled in three years (2006-08)...
- ...to finance consumption and investments.
- As of mid-2008, ~\$40 billion of debts was due to repay in <1 year.
- International reserves stood at \$35 billion.


• Debt rollover became very difficult during the initial stages of international liquidity crisis.

SigmaBleyzer

Source: NBU, The Bleyzer Foundation

# **Vulnerability #3 – Banking Sector Weaknesses**

#### Non-performing Loans in Selected Emerging Markets as % of Total Loans, 2008




Source: IMF GFS Report, Apr. 2009

- Bank lending grew by 70% pa over 2006-08.
- This growth was supported by:
  - improved access to foreign capital
  - the entrance of foreign banks
  - loose domestic monetary policy.
- 50% of total loans were issued in foreign currency.
- The share of non-performing loans (NPLs) was high -14.5% in 2008.

10

# **Banking Sector Weaknesses (cont.)**

#### Banks' Deposit Base, quarterly change in stock




- During the crisis, commercial banks faced:
  - closed access to international credit markets;
  - large debt repayments needs;
  - high currency risks;
  - fast growth of NPLs.
- The combination of the above led to bank runs.
- From October 2008 to April 2009, about ¼ of bank deposits were lost.

Source: NBU, The Bleyzer Foundation

11

# **Severe Domestic Credit Squeeze**




- Before the crisis, the credit-to-GDP ratio grew from 20% (2002) to 77% (2008).
- After the crisis, bank lending sharply decelerated due to:
  - tight access to foreign capital and domestic funds;
  - deposit withdrawals;
  - rising NPLs; and
  - tight money supply.

- Source: NBU, IMF, The Bleyzer Foundation
- Although liquidity support was provided to a number of banks .....
- .....it appears that it may not have been used to increase lending.

12

# Hryvnia Depreciation -One of the World's Largest


#### Foreign Exchange Market Performance



- During 4Q 2008, Hryvnia lost more than 50% of its value to US Dollar.
- Sharp depreciation was due to:
  - Intense vulnerabilities (CA deficits, debt repayments, weaker banking sector);
  - Inadequate monetary policy;
  - Fragile political situation;
  - Conflicting statements about the future exchange rate;
  - Loss of competitiveness.

# Ukraine's Loss of Relative Competitiveness (based on Purchasing Power Parity)

- High inflation in Ukraine 12.5% pa on average over 2000-2008.
- Virtually stable exchange rate.
- Normally, loss of competitiveness adjusts through exchange rate depreciation.



PPP with Base Year 2002	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Inflation Diff Index Ukr-Us	100	106	115	123	134	150	182	210	237
REER - US		5.7	6.2	6.5	7.1	8.0	9.7	11.2	<b>12.6</b>
Inflation Diff Index Ukr-MTP	100	101	105	109	115	124	141	154	167
REER - MTP		5.4	5.6	5.8	6.1	6.6	7.5	8.2	8.9
REER - Real Effective Exchange Rate									

# Ukrainian Authorities' Response – Adequate Measures

- Secured financial assistance from the IMF, the WB, other international institutions;
- Maintained good fiscal discipline;
- Avoided major increases in social payments arrears;
- Carried out stress tests for commercial banks;
- Supported systemic banks;
- Progressed towards a more flexible exchange rate;
- Developed non-systemic bank resolution program;
- Controlled inflation;
- Kept Current Account deficits on a downward trend.

# Ukrainian Authorities' Response – Insufficient Measures

- Ineffective across-the-board coordination.
- Insufficient provision of funds to the economy.
- Poor control over the use of provided liquidity.
- Failure to reach agreement on utility price increases.
- Lack of a comprehensive strategy to restore Naftogaz and Pension Fund solvency.
- Delays in privatization and the lack of a transparent privatization strategy.

# Measures to Avoid a Crisis Deepening

- Presidential elections scheduled on January 2010.
- Political uncertainties may undermine decisionmaking and hinder economic recovery.
- To avoid the threats of crisis deepening, the authorities should:
  - Maintain prudent fiscal policy;
  - Maintain balanced monetary policy;
  - Effectively supervise banking system.
  - Continued co-operation with the IMF is essential.

# Measures to Accelerate Economic Development

- Past sources of economic growth (exports and credit) are limited
- Investments may become the new growth engine
- Ukraine's economic outlook is still bright:
  - Exports should be stimulated by membership in the WTO.
  - The proposed EU-FTA would encourage FDIs and exports.
  - FDIs will also be supported by abundant and educated labor.
  - Labor wages are 1/3 of those in Eastern Europe.
  - Ukraine population of 46 million people is an attractive market.
  - Ukraine agricultural potential is quite high.
  - Ukraine's infrastructure and technological base are reasonable.

## Measures to Accelerate Economic Development (cont.)

- But realization of this outlook requires major improvement in the business climate.
- For this, authorities should:
  - Bring stability and predictability to the legal environment;
  - Reform the judiciary;
  - Reduce the costs of doing business;
  - Improve public administration
  - Reduce corruption;
  - Reach an Enhanced Free Trade Agreement with the EU;
  - Support efficiency and productivity growth.